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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
NO. 07-1301
LEROY WIGGINS,
Appellant,
v.

JUDGE MICHAEL A. DONIO, Superior Court Judge of Atlantic County; JEFFREY S.
BLITZ, Prosecutor of Atlantic County, in their individual and official capacity
____________________________________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civ. No. 07-cv-00104)
District Judge: Honorable Renee Marie Bumb
_______________________________________
Submitted For Possible Dismissal Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
July 26, 2007
Before: RENDELL, SMITH AND JORDAN, CIRCUIT JUDGES
(Filed August 17, 2007)
_______________________
OPINION
_______________________
PER CURIAM
Leroy Wiggins appeals from the order of the United States District Court for the
District of New Jersey sua sponte dismissing his in forma pauperis complaint for failure
to state a claim. Because we conclude that this appeal lacks an arguable basis, we will

dismiss it pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
I.
Wiggins, a New Jersey state inmate, submitted a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
together with supporting exhibits. He named as defendants Judge Michael A. Donio,
Superior Court Judge of Atlantic County, and Jeffrey S. Blitz, the Atlantic County
Prosecutor. Both were sued in their individual and official capacities.
In 1994, an Atlantic County jury found Wiggins guilty of various drug, firearm,
and theft offenses. The Atlantic County Superior Court sentenced Wiggins as a
“persistent offender,” and he received an aggregate sentence of 30 years’ imprisonment
with 15 years of parole ineligibility. On or about November 30, 2006, Wiggins filed in
the Superior Court a collateral motion to correct an illegal sentence under New Jersey
Court Rule 3:22. In his supporting brief, Wiggins argued that his current sentence
violated his constitutional rights under Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), and
that the New Jersey Supreme Court’s ruling in State v. Natale, 878 A.2d 724 (N.J. 2005),
deciding that Blakely was a “new rule of law” inapplicable on collateral review, was itself
contrary to the holding in Blakely. (Pl.’s Ex. A.) In an order filed on December 8, 2006,
Judge Donio denied “Defendant’s Motion for Post Conviction Relief and Correction of an
Illegal Sentence.” (Pl.’s Ex. Da2.) Judge Donio explained this summary denial in an
accompanying letter opinion. The letter opinion stated that the current motion “merely
reiterates the same arguments that you made before” in two motions for post-conviction
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relief that the Superior Court had rejected and that therefore “your contention that you are
entitled to resentencing under Natale is without merit” for the reasons already provided in
its prior decisions. (Pl.’s Compl. Ex. Da1.)
In his § 1983 complaint, Wiggins alleged that Judge Donio, in a conspiracy with Blitz,
violated his federal constitutional rights and state law by denying his post-conviction motion
for correction. Judge Donio allegedly committed perjury in the letter opinion by
misrepresenting the grounds of Wiggins’s motion. Wiggins allegedly “never sought to be
resentenced under Natale,” which he had attacked as contrary to Blakely’s holding. (Compl.
at 7.) Judge Donio also allegedly acted not as a judge but as an attorney for the State because
he failed to consider whether to appoint counsel and then dismissed Wiggins’s motion before
Blitz had filed any response. According to Wiggins, Blitz conspired with Judge Donio by
failing to file an answer or motion to dismiss after his post-conviction motion was served.
Wiggins claimed that the two defendants violated the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth
Amendments, the Supremacy Clause, as well as the “procedures, rules, customs, ordinances
and usage of the State of New Jersey.” (Compl. at 8.) Wiggins requested a “mandatory
injunction to [en]force his Rights under Law.” (Compl. at 10.)
On January 16, 2007, the District Court granted Wiggins’s application for in forma
pauperis status and dismissed his complaint without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§
1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b) for failure to state a claim. The District Court found that any
remedy would necessarily imply the invalidity or modification of his current sentence and
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that his claims therefore were not cognizable under § 1983. Wiggins timely appealed.
The Clerk granted Wiggins in forma pauperis status on appeal, and Wiggins filed a
motion for appointment of counsel.
II.
Because Wiggins is proceeding in forma pauperis, we must determine whether this
appeal should be dismissed as frivolous pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). We will dismiss
the appeal because it “lacks an arguable basis in either law or in fact.” Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).
The District Court properly dismissed the complaint without prejudice because the
claims necessarily called into question the validity and duration of Wiggins’s current
criminal sentence. A party may not bring a § 1983 claim if success “would necessarily
imply the invalidity” of a conviction or sentence that has not already been reversed,
expunged, declared invalid, or called into question by issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.
Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994). Wiggins claimed that his rights were
violated when Judge Donio denied his motion to correct his sentence under Blakely. But
by directly attacking a Superior Court decision denying a motion for post-conviction
relief, Wiggins essentially challenged the otherwise valid sentence that he is currently
serving. “[W]hen a state prisoner is challenging the very fact or duration of his physical
imprisonment, and the relief he seeks is a determination that he is entitled to immediate
release or a speedier release from that imprisonment, his sole federal remedy is a writ of
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habeas corpus.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973) (emphasis added).
Given that the success of Wiggins’s § 1983 claims would necessarily imply the invalidity
of his present sentence, the District Court appropriately dismissed them as barred.
III.
Due to the lack of an arguable basis for the appeal, we will dismiss it pursuant to §
1915(e)(2)(B). We will likewise deny Wiggins’s motion for appointment of counsel.
See, e.g., Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 155 (3d Cir. 1993) (stating that “threshold” for
appointment of counsel was whether claim had arguable merit).
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